Occupational Radiation Exposure Analysis of US ITER DCLL TBM by Merrill, Brad J et al.
The INL is a U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory 
operated by Battelle Energy Alliance 
INL/EXT-07-13073
Occupational Radiation 
Exposure Analysis of US 
ITER DCLL TBM 
Brad J. Merrill 
Lee C. Cadwallader 
Mohamad Dagher 
August 2007 
INL/EXT-07-13073
Occupational Radiation Exposure Analysis of US ITER 
DCLL TBM 
Brad J. Merrill1
Lee C. Cadwallader1
Mohamad Dagher2
1Idaho National Laboratory 
2University of California Los Angeles 
August 2007 
Idaho National Laboratory 
 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 
Prepared for the 
U.S. Department of Energy 
Office of Nuclear Energy 
Under DOE Idaho Operations Office 
Contract DE-AC07-05ID14517

iii
ABSTRACT
This report documents an Occupational Radiation Exposure (ORE) analysis that was performed for 
the US International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) Dual Coolant Lead Lithium (DCLL) 
Test Blanket Module (TBM).  This analysis was performed with the QADMOD dose code for anticipated 
maintenance activities for this TBM concept and its ancillary systems.  The QADMOD code was used to 
model the PbLi cooling loop of this TBM concept by specifying gamma ray source terms that simulated 
radioactive material within the piping, valves, heat exchanger, permeator, pump, drain tank, and cold trap 
of this cooling system.  Estimates of the maintenance tasks that will have to be performed and the time 
required to perform these tasks where developed based on either expert opinion or on industrial 
maintenance experience for similar technologies.  This report details the modeling activity and the 
calculated doses for the maintenance activities envisioned for the US DCLL TBM. 
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1Occupational Radiation Exposure Analysis of US ITER 
DCLL TBM 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As a Participant Team (PT) in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) 
Program, the US is proposing a Test Blanket Module (TBM) concept called the Dual Coolant Lead Lithium 
(DCLL) TBM for testing in ITER (Wong, 2005).  This module concept is a scaled version of a blanket 
module that the US believes will make an effective blanket module for a fusion demonstration reactor 
(DEMO).  As part of the licensing process for ITER, the ITER International Organization (IO) has 
requested that TBM blanket modules that are to be tested in ITER also obtain a license.  The licensing of 
these TBMs will be accomplished by the same process as that being followed to license ITER.  As part of 
this process, an analysis of the maintenance activities anticipated for the DCLL TBM and the predicted 
worker doses associated with those activities must be developed.  This analysis is called an Occupational 
Radiation Exposure (ORE) analysis.  This report documents the ORE analysis performed for the US DCLL 
TBM.
The following section (Section 2) describes the physical layout of the PbLi equipment of the DCLL 
TBM that will be a concern from the standpoint of maintenance.  Section 3 describes the anticipated 
maintenance activities for this equipment.  Section 4 presents the approach taken and source terms used to 
estimate the worker dose for these activities.  Section 5 gives the estimated ORE results for maintaining the 
DCLL TBM.  The final section (Section 6) presents conclusions from this ORE analysis. 
22. DCLL TBM System Description 
The DCLL TBM system is composed of three major subsystems. The TBM Frame Assembly is 
composed of the DCLL TBM, Shielding, and the Water Cooled Frame.  This assembly is inserted into the 
vacuum vessel port extension at the equatorial level.  The Ancillary Equipment Unit (AEU) is located just 
outside the Bio-Shield in the port cell area inside of the AEU transporter. This transporter houses the Pb-Li 
primary coolant loop, the tritium extraction system and all of the control and diagnostic equipment for the 
TBM (note Figure 2).  The secondary cooling loop for the TBM rejects heat to helium-to-water heat 
exchangers (not shown in these figures) of the helium AEU located in the Tokamak Cooling Water System 
(TCWS) vault.  Some tritium will diffuse into this helium cooling loop from the circulating PbLi within the 
breeder zones of this TBM.  However, the anticipated amount of tritium is small, less than 100 mg/year.  
Most of this tritium will diffuse into the piping of this system, but some will reside in the helium heat 
exchanger and circulating equipment inside the TCWS vault.  Even though care must be taken in 
maintaining this equipment, the more pressing maintenance concern is for the PbLi cooling loop and the 
DCLL TBM itself.  A view of this equipment as it is positioned in the port cell area appears in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Physical layout of DCLL TBM in the ITER equatorial port cell.
3Pb-Li flow between the TBM frame assembly and the AEU is handled using a concentric pipe system 
where the hot PbLi flow out of the TBM is in the inner pipe while the outer pipe carries the cold inlet flow.  
This pipe is running in a straight segment between the TBM assembly and the AEU with special slip joints 
on the internal pipe to accommodate thermal expansion.  The outer pipe expansion is handled through 
double walled Bellows at both ends.  Helium coolant between the TBM and the AEU is carried through two 
individual pipes with expansion loops and flexible hangers in the equatorial port inner space area.  
Additional piping and connection between the TBM and the AEU are designed to handle the purge gas 
flow, power, control and diagnostic connections.  Helium pipes and other connections are running between 
the AEU and the TCWS vault for the secondary coolant loop.  The view of how this equipment resides in 
the transporter cask appears in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  View of the Ancillary Equipment Unit as it resides in the transporter cask.
3. ANTICIPATED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY TIME ESTIMATES 
To perform a radiological dose assessment of workers occupying radiation zones, the expected 
residence times are needed. The active repair time is the time that workers are at or near the component in 
question, performing the necessary tasks.  Total repair time is generally referred to as the entire component 
outage time, and it includes the system shut down and cool down, time spent “safing” the system for 
personnel access, time to bring spare parts to the work location, time spent outside the radiation zone 
preparing for the labor activity, and the post-repair system testing to demonstrate that the repair is good and 
4the system can be returned to service.  The active repair time is the time sought here to give radiation dose 
estimates.  This section describes the anticipated maintenance activities for the TBM and its PbLi AEU.  
The helium AEU will contain insignificant levels of tritium (< 0.1 g) and worker doses from maintenance 
activities on the equipment of this system, located in the TCWS vault where radiation levels are also low, 
will be negligible in comparison to the maintenance activities for the PbLi AEU, which are described in this 
section.
3.1 TBM Replacement Time Estimate 
The major maintenance activity for the DCLL TBM will be the replacement of the TBM, which will 
occur approximately every other year during ITER DT operation.  The maintenance operations for replacing 
a TBM assembly are: 
1. Removal of the AEU from the equatorial port cell area 
2. Clearing the port inner space area and removing the TBM Frame assembly from the vacuum 
vessel
3. Transporting TBM Frame assembly to the hot cell for further work 
4. TBM Frame assembly re-installation into the equatorial port cell area, and 
5. Reconnecting of all piping and provisioning the AEU to support the TBM operation. 
Operations at the equatorial port area are assumed to be primarily hands-on operations as long as the 
vacuum vessel plug is closed.  The TBM frame assembly removal and insertion in the vacuum vessel port 
extension is a completely automated process designed by ITER and using ITER’s standard port plug 
removal transporter. 
Operations in the port cell area involving the removal of the AEU are considered hands provided that 
the proper shielding of the components inside the transporter is installed to limit worker’s exposure to 
radiation. However, the concentric pipe carrying the Pb-Li flow will have a residual Pb-Li film on the 
inside. Special precautions and additional containment tents will be needed around the pipe during cutting 
and welding operations to avoid containment of other components (note Figure 3 for an example). 
Furthermore, special storage and transportation provisions must be available to handle these components. 
Hands on operations are also assumed for the port inner space area to clear all the piping and provide 
access for the transporter to remove the TBM assembly.  It is expected that once the Bio-Shield is opened, 
workers will be exposed to higher dose rates.  Alternative design would be to consider a fully automated 
remote handling process to remove all piping and fitting from this space. 
The Bio-Shield plug removal is still under discussion as there are different concepts for the Bio 
shield plug design.  The current estimate is based on a Bio-Shield plug design made of blocks that could be 
stacked around the penetrating pipes and could be removed in pieces thus allowing flexible design and 
simple operation for plug removal and installation.  However other concepts are under discussion such as 
the EU concept where the Bio-Shield plug forms an integral part of the AEU and the inner space pipe 
assembly.  Further design evaluations and discussions with ITER and the other parties sharing the port are 
needed to agree on a common design that will accommodate the design requirements of both TBMs. 
Table 1 contains the summary estimate of times required to perform the TBM replacement.  A more 
detailed listing of the assumptions used in arriving at these estimates is given in the Appendix A.  The 
5current time estimate presented in this report is based on performing multiple concurrent operations at the 
same time.  However it does not take into account operations needed by the other parties sharing the same 
port.  This may create time and scheduling conflicts that will affect the procedure, the allowed time, and 
may impact some of the component and equipment design as well. As more design details become available 
and more interaction between the parties takes place, the TBM maintenance procedure will most likely 
develop further and more accurate estimates can be presented. 
3.2 PbLi AEU Maintenance Time Estimate 
In addition to the major activity of TBM replacement, components of the PbLi AEU will have to be 
maintained during the TBM replacement operation.  The anticipated maintenance activities will depend on 
the failure rate of the components of the PbLi AEU.  Unfortunately, there is very little data on PbLi systems 
from which to estimate how often a given component of this AEU will have to be maintained or replaced.  
As with the component failure rate data needs in the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the Pb-17Li 
flow loop (Cadwallader, 2007), representative data from liquid sodium fission reactors was sought first as 
representative data for this assessment.  However, literature searches revealed that there has been little 
published information on maintenance of US sodium reactors.  Two papers gave some overall radiation 
exposures for two sodium reactors, the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) near Hanford, Washington (Bunch, 
1990), and the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II near Idaho Falls, Idaho (Olson, 1986). 
Other sodium–cooled and liquid metal reactor experiences were searched as well.  Notably, the 
Dounreay Fast Reactor, a NaK cooled, 50 MW-thermal plant, discovered a small leak of ~100 liters NaK 
per day in May 1967 (Matthews, 1968).  The plant shut down to find and repair the leak in a 4 inch pipeline 
on July 29, 1967.  The Dounreay plant restarted on June 22, 1968.  This was roughly eleven months of 
outage time for a 100 liter/day leak.  The Phoenix sodium-cooled plant had cracks forming in some of the 
superheater and reheater tubes (Cavagna, 2006).  In 2001 a building was constructed to handle the tubes for 
weld repair.  Over nine months in 2002, forty-seven steam generator superheater/reheater modules (7 tubes 
per module) measuring 16.9 m long were removed, given > 160 hours of cleaning, and then were welded 
and radiographed.  In two additional months in 2002, all of the modules were reassembled in the Phoenix 
steam generator.  Assuming that just one of these modules is comparable to a TBM heat exchanger, then 11 
months for 334 days/47 modules gives roughly 7 days per module.  This is a poor average, since the time to 
uninstall and reinstall the tube module is distributed over all of the modules, but it does give the order of 
magnitude of a tube repair activity. 
This document treats repair time, which is the time expected for the active repair of components by 
corrective maintenance (e.g., replacing a seal on an existing component).  Times for operational tests, 
surveillance tests and other inspections are not known at present, although some operational testing (e.g. 
pressure testing) for the AEU has been included in the time estimate of Section 3.1.  Some component 
repair times for water system components in nuclear and in typical industrial environments have been 
assembled to apply to the Pb-17Li flow loop.  Unfortunately, statistical tabulations of repair time data are 
sparse in the literature.  The best known sources of averaged labor times are for construction labor 
estimating (Means, 2007) and for automobile mechanical repair (Chilton, 2007).  Without fusion or fission 
6Table 1. Time estimates for replacing the DCLL TBM. 
Task
Number Description 
Process
Type
Bio-Shield
Plug
Status
Total
Time (hr) 
     
Total 388.00 
1 Remove AEU from Port cell Area  Closed 65.00 
1.1 Prepare AEU for system separation and relocation to 
storage and maintenance area including tools.  Closed 8.00 
1.2 Cut and remove primary and secondary He coolant 
lines between AEU and Pipe chase area  Closed 22.00 
1.3 Cut and remove primary and secondary He coolant 
lines between AEU and Bio-Shield Plug  Closed 7.50 
1.4 Cut and separate Concentric Pb-Li pipe assembly Hands on Closed 26.50 
1.5 Transfer AEU to maintenance area   1.00 
2 Bio-Shield Plug removal 11.00 
2.1 Port Preparation and bio-shield removal   11.00 
3 Equatorial Port Interspace Pipe removal  Open 48.00 
3.1 Interspace Preparation process Hands on Open 10.00 
3.2 Pipe Hanger removal   21.00 
3.3 Concentric pipe removal   5.00 
3.4 He Pipe removal   12.00 
4 Port Flange Preparation 13.00 
4.1 Position special tooling for Port Flange cutting and 
Un-Bolting Hands on Open 4.00 
4.2 Perform Lip Seal cutting operation, clean and 
remove all debris Hands on Open 6.00 
4.3 Un-Bolt all Port flange nuts and store Hands on Open 3.00 
5 Port plug Assembly removal, transportation and 
insertion into hot cell 
Automated
RH process 
TBD by 
ITER
6 Port plug testing, and assembly Installation Automated
RH process 
TBD by 
ITER
7 Port Interspace Pipe and service equipment 
Installation 106.00 
7.1 Port Preparation  Open 13.00 
7.2 Port Interspace Pipe Installation   Open 89.00 
7.3 Remove all temporary supports, tooling, equipment 
and clean Port Interspace area, and remove storage 
container from Port cell area Hands on Open 4.00 
8 Bio-Shield Plug Installation 25.00 
8.1 Position tooling and supports around Bio-shield door 
opening Hands on Open 6.00 
8.2 position Bio-Shield Plug transporter in port cell area Hands on Open 3.00 
78.3 Open transporter and install Bio-Shield Plug Hands on Open 8.00 
8.4 Install seals around pipe penetrations through the 
Bio-Shield Plug. Hands on Open 5.00 
8.5 Remove Bio-Shield Transporter, all tooling, supports 
and equipment from Port Cell area. Hands on Open 3.00 
9 AEU installation  Closed 120.00 
9.1 Port cell preparation. Temporary supports, 
equipment, tools and saftey equipment Hands on Closed 6.00 
9.2 Position AEU in Port Cell Area, connect to building 
power check equipment status inside the transporter. Hands on Closed 4.00 
9.3 TBM/AEU Service connections  Closed 41.00 
9.4 AEU/Pipe chase area connections Hands on Closed 53.00 
9.5 Pressure testing, leak testing and full system test and 
inspection including service qualification Hands on Closed 10.00 
9.6 Remove all equipment, tooling, temporary supports, 
and testing equipment from port cell area. Hands on Closed 6.00 
     
liquid metal maintenance time data readily available, water cooling system data are used here.  The water 
system data mainly come from power generation, both fossil and nuclear, and other commercial industries.  
The TBM is much smaller than the components maintained in the power generation industry, so effort was 
made to find repair times applicable to small size components.  For example, Milivojevic (1989) gave repair 
times for Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) primary cooling pumps that ranged from 142.9 hours to 500 
hours in the first 10,000 hours of operation.  The repair time peaked at 2,000 hours and was as low as 100 
hours over pump lifetime.  The overall Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) was ~1,000 hours.  However, a 
PWR primary coolant pump is large (7.5 MW, versus 20 kW for the TBM, and water flows of ~3.5x105
kg/minute versus Pb-17Li flow at 72 kg/minute) and requires different maintenance demands (scaffolds, 
cranes, etc.) to service the unit.  Comparing Milivojevic data on a set of about 500 PWR pumps to collected 
data on smaller water pump units shows that for smaller centrifugal pumps, the mean time to repair 
(MTTR) is much smaller:  6.8 hours (pumps flowing less than 3.6x103 kg/minute), 7.8 hours (pumps with 
flow rates between 3.6 and 7.3x103 kg/minute), and 26.7 hours (pumps with flow rates between 7.3 and 
3.64x105 kg/minute) (Shultz, 1982; Cullinane, 1989).  Another important source of repair times has been 
given by Butler (2000) for repairs to shipboard components – these components are much closer to the 
TBM in size than the large power plant components.  When repair times for small size components were not 
available, the repair times for large-scale components were ratioed down to apply to the TBM.  The US 
TBM is helium and lithium-lead cooled rather than water-cooled, but the power industry data for water 
system components are the most representative repair times available to apply to the low pressure PbLi 
components of interest, and are presently the most reasonable data to use for the scoping ORE assessment. 
The main Pb-17Li flow loop components, their failure rates and failure probabilities per year (taken 
from the TBM preliminary failure modes and effects analysis tables), and the average active repair times, 
that is, the MTTR values, are listed in Table 2.  The probabilities of component failure in this table are for 
the anticipated operational time of the AEU, which is 0.528 FPY over the 15 year life time of the AEU 
(Wong, 2005).  Because the TBM will be replaced about every two years, the PbLi AEU will most like 
undergo repairs during this same period of time.  However, the probabilities of Table 2 are given as annual 
probabilities to facilitate the ORE analysis. 
8Table 2.  Component Failure Rates and Repair Times 
Component
type
Component
count
Overall
“all
modes”
failure
rate
Probability
of a 
component
in this type 
failing in a 
calendar
year
Mean
Time
to Repair
(hours)
Person-
hours
active
repair
time
(hours)
Reference 
Motor
controller
1 7.6E-05/h 0.26 c 2.4 assume 4.8 Cullinane, 
1989
Circuit
breaker
1 3E-07/h 0.001 6.0 assume 12 IEEE, 1997 
Pump motor 1 5.5E-03/d 
(hourly 
motor faults 
were 
included 
with the 
pump) 
0.04 c 50.2 assume 
100.4 
IEEE, 1997 
Pump  1 8.23E-05/h 0.28 c 6.8 assume 
13.6
Cullinane,
1989
Level sensor 2 2.4E-06/h 0.016 6 assume 12 Hannaman, 
1978
Pressure
sensor
3 2E-06/h 0.021 6 assume 12 Hannaman, 
1978
Temperature 
sensor
3 1.92E-05/h 0.18 c 6 assume 12 Hannaman, 
1978
Piping 200 m 1.29E-
08/h-m 
0.006 30 per leak assume 60 
12.5 per m 
Hannaman, 
1978
Butler, 2000 
Check valve 3 2E-04/d  + 
2.5E-06/h 
0.024  24 assume 48 Hannaman, 
1978
Motor
operated valve 
12 1E-03/d  + 
1.65E-05/h 
0.11 c 7.5 15 Butler, 2000 
Flow control 
valve
2 1E-03/d  + 
2.4E-06/h 
0.022  7.5 15 Butler, 2000 
Transition to 
concentric
pipe
1 5.05E-08/h 0.00017 30 per leak assume 60 Hannaman, 
1978
Concentric
pipe
2 m 6.69E-08/h 0.00022 30 per leak assume 60 Hannaman, 
1978
Concentric
pipe inlet to 
TBM
1 3.3E-05/h 0.11 c Remote 
handling
--
9Table 2.  Component Failure Rates and Repair Times, continued. 
Component
type
Component
count
Overall
“all
modes”
failure
rate
Probability
of a 
component
in this type 
failing in a 
calendar
year
Mean
Time
to Repair
(hours)
Person-
hours
active
repair
time
(hours)
Reference 
Concentric
pipe outlet 
from TBM 
1 1E-04/y 0.0001 Remote 
handling
--
Mixing tank 1 1.05E-07/h 0.00035 40 assume 80 Hannaman, 
1978
T extraction 
tank
1 2.4E-06/h 0.008 30 assume 60 Hannaman, 
1978
Pb-Li to He 
heat
exchanger
1 4.11E-06/h 0.014 30 assume 60 Hannaman, 
1978
Pump 
expansion
tank
1 2.11E-05/h 0.07 c 40 assume 80 Hannaman, 
1978
Cold trap 1 1.15E-05/h 0.039 c 20 assume 40  analyst 
judgment 
Cold trap heat 
exchanger
1 1.1E-06/h 0.004 20 assume 40  analyst 
judgment 
Drain tank 1 1.1E-06/h 0.004 40 assume 80 Hannaman, 
1978
Rupture disk 1 1E-04/d  + 
1E-05/h
0.034 c 1 assume 2 analyst 
judgment 
Pressure relief 
valve
1 4.16E-06/h 0.014 7.5 15 assumed 
from Butler, 
2000
Drain tank 
electric heater 
1 1.56E-06/h 0.005 4 assume 8 analyst 
judgment 
Notes: Used 3,360 Pb-17Li loop operating hours/year to obtain annual failure probabilities.  Used guidance 
from Derdiger (1981) to estimate man-hours needed given the MTTR value. 
Probability of complete overhaul or replacement over the 15-year lifetime of the TBM project (~50,000 
hours operating time) is considered to occur if the (probability/year)(15 years) is greater than 0.5.  If a “c”
appears in the probability column then the component is expected to require a changeout; that is, one major 
overhaul or replacement during the 15-year project life.  The motor controller is probably not in the 
radiation area, it can be close to the motor control center electrical panel. 
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Figure 3.  Depiction of the inert atmosphere seal bag for welding piping.  (Isozaki, 2005) 
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4. APPROACH TAKEN AND SOURCE TERMS 
Two shielding codes available at INL were used to perform this ORE analysis, which are the 
MicroShield and QADMOD-GP codes.  The MicroShield code (MicroShield, 2006) is a commercially 
available code from Grove Software.  It is a deterministic code, that is, MicroShield is a ray tracing code.  
MicroShield uses simple gamma source geometries, which are spherical, cylindrical, annular, or planar 
sources.  The code allows only one radioactive source per calculation, but this single source can include 
multiple radionuclides that emit gamma rays.  A complete radionuclide data base is included with this code 
to facilitate the user in defining decay rates, gamma ray energies and dose conversion factors.  MicroShield 
will allow the user the possibility to define multiple shields with buildup factors of the same geometries as 
the source, and as with the source terms, the code includes a data base for shield material densities, 
attenuation coefficients and buildup factors. 
The QADMOD-GP code (Warkentin, 1990) was obtained from the Radiation Safety Information 
Computational Center (RSICC) at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).  This code is a point kernel 
gamma-ray shielding code, which also performs a gamma ray tracing analysis for point-kernel source terms.  
QADMOD-GP will allow for either one distributed source, simulated by up to 27,000 point-kernel sources, 
or up to 1000 user defined point-kernel source locations for a given calculation.  Cartesian, cylindrical, or 
spherical geometries are allowed for defining shielding and regions being modeled, with geometric 
progression buildup factors, attenuation coefficients and material densities available for some shielding 
materials.  Both of these shielding codes calculate the equivalent dose rate (mSv/hr) at a number of user 
specified locations. 
The primary difficulty in using either of these codes to perform the ORE analyses for the DCLL 
TBM and its PbLi AEU is the very complicated component arrangement of these systems, as can be seen in 
Figures 1 and 2.  Because the MicroShield code only allows for a single source per calculation, modeling 
the complex radiation field of an AEU piping systems is not directly possible, plus summing the 
contributions manually to obtain the total dose at all of the maintenance location envision from multiple 
MicroShield source term calculations without introducing errors would be extremely difficult.  The 
QADMOD-GP code also only allows for a single distributed source term per calculation, leaving the task of 
summing the dose from all of the individual AEU components up to the user.  But, QADMOD-GP does 
allow for multiple point-kernel source definitions per calculation, which allows for a dose estimate from all 
of the AEU components within a single calculation provided that the point-kernel source terms can be 
defined to accurately simulate the radiation emitted by these components. 
There are two additional problems with using the QADMOD-GP code for this analysis.  The first is 
the QADMOD-GP combinatorial geometry input for defining shielding regions makes the modeling of 
complex systems, like the AEU, difficult for the user to specify correctly.  The second is that the 
QADMOD-GP code, by default, only contains information for eight gamma ray energy groups to simulate 
the gamma energy spectrum of the AEU.  The code also only includes material buildup factors, attenuation 
coefficients, and dose conversion factors for these eight energy groups.  However, based on the 
radionuclides supplied by the user, the MicroShield code will automatically simulate the gamma ray energy 
spectrum with 25 groups by default, plus the required material buildup factors, attenuation coefficients, and 
dose conversion factors.  Given the radionuclides present in the AEU, the MicroShield code defined 17 
energy groups in the 0.015 to 1.5 MeV energy range.  In this same energy range, QADMOD-GP only 
models three energy groups by default.  This would mean that in order to obtain an accurate dose estimate 
with QADMOD-GP, new material buildup factors, attenuation coefficients, and dose conversion factors 
would have to be derived an supplied to the code through user input.  The solution to this modeling 
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dilemma for the AEU was to realize that the dose rate predicted by any ray tracing code is directly 
proportional to strength of the user defined point-kernel or distribute gamma source.  Therefore, a model 
that accurately represented the AEU could be developed by using multiple point-kernel source terms in 
QADMOD-GP (note Figure 4) and then adjust or “tune” the strength of these sources so that the predicted 
gamma dose from QADMOD-GP matched the result dose from MicroShield on a component by component 
basis.  This would have the affect of simulating the gamma ray energy spectrum, attenuation, buildup, and 
anticipated dose by the QADMOD-GP multiple point-kernel source AEU model without having to define 
more energy groups or shielding in this QADMOD-GP model.  The QADMOD-GP in essence is summing 
up the doses from all of the AEU components as predicted by the MicroShield code at a point in space.  We 
present more details on this modeling approach below, but before we do, we will discuss the gamma source 
terms that the TBM and AEU will contain during maintenance. 
 There will be two sources of radioactive material in the AEU, activated PbLi and activated F82H 
corrosion products.  During maintenance, most of the PbLi will reside in the drain tank.  However, based on 
TRITEX facility (Feuerstein, 1999) experience it was discovered that after draining the TRITEX loop, PbLi 
films were found on the pipe walls that were on average ~45 mg/cm2.  Similar films are expected to adhere 
to the inner surfaces of all of the components in the AEU.  According to activation calculations performed 
for the DCLL TBM (Wong, 2005), these films will be radioactive, with the activity after one week 
dominated by Pb-203 (a gamma emitter). 
In addition to the activated PbLi films, the hot surfaces within the TBM and the outlet PbLi pipe wall 
will undergo corrosion at the PbLi/Ferritic Steel (FS) interface.  Because the TBM FS surfaces are 
activated, the corrosion products from TBM will mix into the PbLi bulk flow and be deposited, along with 
the non-radioactive FS corrosion products from the PbLi outlet pipe, on to the inside surfaces of the cooler 
components of the AEU, such as pipe walls, heat exchanger tubes, valves, permeator tubes, etc.  The 
anticipated corrosion rate of these hot surfaces is 20 μm/yr at 450ºC based on experimental data (Moriyama, 
1995).  This corrosion will only occur at high PbLi temperatures and flow rates (e.g. during a pulse), 
therefore over the lifetime of the AEU there will be 41,500 x 400s or 0.526 full power years (FPY) of 
operation, which translates into ~11 μm of erosion from these hot surfaces.  Because the cool area to hot 
area ratio in the TBM/AEU system is 6 to 1, then the predicted corrosion product thickness in the AEU will 
be about 1.8 μm.  According to activation calculations performed for the TBM (Wong, 2005), Fe-55 and 
Mn-54 will dominate the corrosion film activity (gamma emitters) one week after reactor shutdown. 
There is an added complication with respect to the corrosion products, and that is that unlike the PbLi 
which is continuously circulating through the neutron radiation field within the reactor, the corrosion 
products will be deposited outside of this field once they enter the PbLi flow.  Once deposited on the walls 
of the AEU components, these corrosion products will begin to decay.  To account for this decay, the 
following rate equation was solved for the film: 
iii
i CȜS
dt
dC            (1) 
where
 Ci = concentration of the ith corrosion product radioactive element (m-3)
 t = deposition time (yr) 
 Si = source of the ith corrosion product radioactive element (m-3yr-1), and 
Oi = decay constant of the ith radioactive specie in the film (yr-1).
The source term of Equation 1 is the rate of concentration change by deposition of the ith
radioactive element from the TBM FS divided by the time over which the film forms within AEU (e.g., the 
lifetime of the AEU) times the fraction of corrosion coming from the TBM walls to the total corrosion from 
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all hot walls.  For simplicity and conservatism, the radioactive element concentrations associated with the 
TBM wall corrosion products are those element concentrations that exist after end-of-life activation of the 
TBM (e.g., after 0.526 FPY).  The solution to Equation 1 is straight forward with the result being as 
follows:
 ĲȜ
i
o
i
i ie1ȜĲ
CC           (2) 
where W (yr) is the AEU lifetime in calendar years.  Equation 2 was applied to the predominate radioactive 
elements (arbitrarily defined as those elements that have an activity > 1 Ci/m3, which is a factor of 105 less 
than the activity of Fe-55) of the activation calculation output files for the TBM (Wong, 2005) and the 
result used as the corrosion film radioactive elements. 
 With the source terms now defined, a component by component comparison between MicroShield 
and QADMOD-QP was undertaken.  The results for the simplest component of the AEU, which is a 9 cm 
diameter pipe, appear in Table 3.  The MicroShield model is of a single annular source, a film on the inside 
surface of the pipe, and a 1 cm thick iron pipe wall. The resulting dose as a function of distance from the 
film appears in column one of this table.  This is the effective dose equivalent (EDE) rate for the 
anterior/posterior human geometry, which is the highest dose rate of the five EDE geometries considered by 
the MicroShield code.  The first item to note from this column is that the dose rate for the PbLi film alone 
30 cm from the pipe wall is ~0.5 mSv/hr or 500 μSv/hr, which is a factor of 50 higher than the ITER hands 
on maintenance dose goal of 10 μSv/hr (Natalozio, 2005).  To improve on worker safety, the design must 
change to include lead shielding on all of the components (e.g., 1 cm of Pb for all components, except the 
heat exchanger and drain tank where 2 cm and 5 cm of Pb shielding will be required).  The results in 
column two include the attenuation from a 1 cm thick Pb shield in the MicroShield model. 
The QADMOD-GP model is 10 point-kernel sources at the centerline of the pipe over a 1 m pipe 
section (e.g., one source per every 10 cm).  The third column presents the QADMOD-GP dose prediction as 
a function of distance from the source terms without any shielding.  In comparison to the first column, the 
QADMOD-GP dose rate is higher than the MicroShield dose rate (about a factor of 2.1 at 10 cm) and falls 
off a little faster with radial distance (a factor of 1.6 at 60 cm).  Both results use the correct total source 
strength for the film, but the QADMOD-GP result does not include the attenuation of the pipe wall.  In 
general though, the results are in agreement.  The fourth column, labeled pseudo shield, is the QADMOD-
GP result with the point-kernel source strength adjusted to match, within reason, the MicroShield dose rate 
at 60 cm.  The reason for adopting 60 cm can be seen from Figure 4, where the width of AEU is 
approximately this distance.  This “tuned” source strength was used to simulate all of the single piping of 
the AEU in this multiple point-kernel source QADMOD-GP AEU model (Figure 4).  All of the QADMOD-
GP source terms representing the components of the AEU were adjusted component by component to 
obtain the MicroShield dose rate at 60 cm.  In total, the QADMOD-GP model included 245 point-kernel 
gamma source terms to model the entire AEU.  It should be mentioned that this approach will be 
conservative with respect to MicroShield predictions because all maintenance doses in this study are 
estimate at 30 cm from the component.  In the comparison of Table 3, the QADMOD-GP dose rate is higher 
than that of MicroShield for distances less than 60 cm. 
The results from multiple point-kernel source QADMOD-GP AEU model are presented in Figures 
5 and 6 and in Table 4.  Figure 5 contains a plot of the three-dimensional radiation (dose rate in mSv/hr) 
field given off by the AEU.  Figure 6 contains plots of the same information at a two-dimensional R-Z slice 
through the AEU at the toroidal location of the tritium permeator and the PbLi heat exchanger.  Finally, 
Table 4 tabulates the predicted dose rate at strategic maintenance locations in and around the AEU.  These 
dose rates will be used to calculate the ORE estimates that are given in the following section of this report.  
These locations are identified in Figures 7 and 8. 
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Table 3. Comparison of MicroShield to QADMOD-GP dose rates for a 1 m long 
AEU 9 cm pipe with a PbLi film adhering to the inside of the pipe. 
MicroShield QADMOD-GP 
Distance
(cm) 
No shield 
(mSv/hr) 
1 cm Pb shield
(mSv/hr) 
No Shield 
(mSv/hr) 
Pseudo Shield 
(mSv/hr) 
10 1.294 4.63x10-3 2.664 7.449x10-3
20 0.766 2.88x10-3 1.449 4.049x10-3
30 0.527 2.08x10-3 0.944 2.639x10-3
40 0.390 1.62x10-3 0.672 1.877x10-3
50 0.302 1.31x10-3 0.504 1.408x10-3
60 0.241 1.09x10-3 0.392 1.094x10-3
Table 4. QADMOD-GP predicted dose rates as strategic maintenance locations 
(see Figs. 5 and 6) of the AEU. 
Location or component (within 30 cm) Dose (mSv/hr)
Atop transporter over helium pipes near pipe well 8.647x10-03
In pipe well next to helium pipes 2.424x10-02
In front of transporter near double pipe 5.194x10-02
Atop transporter over double pipe 1.313x10-02
Atop transporter over heat exchanger 1.167x10-02
Permeator 6.502x10-02
Pump 4.993x10-02
Cold trap 7.438x10-02
Surge tank 3.518x10-02
Drain tank 8.823x10-02
Heat exchanger 8.278x10-02
Valve A 6.800x10-02
Valve B 8.905x10-02
Valve C 1.414x10-01
Valve D 6.625x10-02
Valve E 2.791x10-02
Valve F 7.074x10-02
Valve G 3.832x10-02
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Figure 4. Illustration of QADMOD-GP source terms locations used to model the DCLL AEU. 
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Dose (mSv/hr)
Figure 5. QADMOD-GP radiation field for the DCLL AEU. 
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Dose (mSv/hr)
Slice through 
permeator
Slice through 
heat exchanger
permeator
heat exchanger
Figure 6. QADMOD-GP radiation field for the DCLL AEU at radial slices through the tritium permeator 
and the PbLi heat exchanger. 
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1. Drain tank
2. PbLi/helium heat exchanger
3. PbLi pump
4. PbLi Surge tank
5. PbLi Cold trap
6. Permeator
Figure 7. AEU component locations at which maintenance dose rates where calculated with the 
QADMOD-GP code. 
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Figure 8. AEU valve locations at which maintenance dose rates where calculated with the QADMOD-GP 
code.
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5. OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURE ESTIMATE 
An ORE analysis is based on the product of dose rate incurred by a technician performing 
maintenance activities on the DCLL TBM and its AEU multiplied by the time required to complete the 
maintenance activity.  An exacting analysis would include a time and motion study in the radiation field 
produced by the DCLL TBM system.  This ORE analysis is based on the maximum dose rate at a location 
of activity, as identified in Table 4, times the entire estimated time to complete that activity.  The dose rates 
were obtained from Table 4, but for activities that occur when the AEU and PbLi interspace pipe are absent 
then dose rates used are those cited in Natalizio (2005).  The time estimate includes the time required by the 
technicians in preparation to perform a maintenance activity, but our ORE assumes that the technician is 
always in the AEU radiation field, making our estimate conservative. 
Table 5 contains the predicted dose for replacing the DCLL TBM.  The Table lists the individual 
doses for the individual activities detailed in Table 1, plus the total dose incurred for the TBM replacement 
operation.  The total dose estimate for replacing the DCLL TBM is 7.4 p-mSv.  This operation will be 
performed approximately every other year, giving an annual committed dose of 3.7 p-mSv/a. 
Table 6 contains the results for component repair activities on the AEU, when the AEU is place in the 
AEU staging area.  In addition to component repair, there will be testing and calibration maintenance 
activities for the AEU while it is docked in the AEU staging area that have not been included here because 
these activities have yet to be identified.  Also, some of these activities are already accounted for in the 
TBM replacement time estimate.  As can be seen from Table 6, the annual committed dose for AEU 
component repair is estimated to be ~1.5 p-mSv/a.  This brings the combined annual dose commitment to 
5.2 p-mSv/a. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this report we have analyzed the anticipated worker radiation exposure for maintaining the 
US ITER DCLL TBM.  Exposure estimates were predicted for the most extensive maintenance 
operation, which is TBM replacement, and the worker doses anticipated for repair of the PbLi 
AEU of the DCLL TBM while this AEU is parked in the staging area during TBM replacement.  
As mentioned in the text, there will be other operations, such as routine inspection and instrument 
calibrations, that were not examined in this study because the schedule for these activities is not 
know at this time.  Our estimate for the activities examined is a combined annual dose commitment of 
5.2 p-mSv/a.  The repair times used here are the best available from the literature, but these times generally 
apply to larger equipment and are probably overestimating actual times for the TBM equipment.  As stated 
earlier, a time and motion study should be conducted as the design matures to give better estimates of the 
necessary maintenance times in radiation fields. 
The ITER Test Blanket Working Group (TBWG) is looking at methods to reduce worker exposure 
during the TBM replacement operation.  One proposal being considered is a European Union (EU) concept 
of combining the bioshield and interspace pipes to the AEU transporter making one complete unit.  This 
would require remote cutting and welding tools to be developed for severing and rejoining the interspace 
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pipes to the TBM at the Vacuum Vessel (VV) port flange location.  By doing this, the predicted dose for 
replacing the DCLL TBM would be reduced by nearly one half to 3.8 p-mSv, or an annual committed dose 
of 1.9 p-mSv/a.  The combined annual dose commitment would also drop to 3.4 p-mSv/a.  This reduction 
would be a benefit to ITER Operations since the ITER ORE goal for TBM maintenance is ~1% of the 
annual maintenance dose for the ITER device.  The predicted value for this dose is 178 p-mSv/a (Natalizio, 
2005), making the goal for DCLL TBM maintenance ~1.8 p-mSv/a.  Therefore, additional effort will be 
required during the final design phase of the DCLL TBM to reduce the ORE dose by one half in order to 
achieve the ITER goal of 1.8 p-mSv/a, since the combined dose of maintenance activities for this TBM is at 
best 3.4 p-mSv/a even with the EU proposal.  Other approaches to reduce ORE include greater effort at 
leaving behind less film when draining the Pb-17Li loop to its drain tank, corrosion product traps, and use 
of temporary shielding during maintenance activities. 
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Table 5. Predicted maintenance doses for replacing the DCLL TBM. 
Task
Number Description Total Time Dose Rate 
Annual
Dose
mSv/hr p-mSv/a 
1 Remove AEU from Port cell Area 65.00 2.410 
1.1
Prepare AEU for system separation and 
relocation to storage and maintenance area 
including tools. 8.00 0.0131 0.105 
1.2
Cut and remove primary and secondary He 
coolant lines between AEU and Pipe chase area 22.00 0.0242 0.533 
1.3
Cut and remove primary and secondary He 
coolant lines between AEU and Bio-Shield Plug 7.50 0.0519 0.390 
1.4 Cut and separate Concentric Pb-Li pipe assembly 26.50 0.0519 1.380 
1.5 Transfer AEU to maintenance area 1.00 0.0050 0.005 
2 Bio-Shield Plug removal 11.00 0.0050 0.055 
3 Equatorial Port Interspace Pipe removal 48.00 0.580 
3.1 Interspace Preparation process 10.00 0.010 0.100 
3.2 Pipe Hanger removal 21.00 0.0139 0.290 
3.3 Concentric pipe removal 5.00 0.0139 0.070 
3.4 He Pipe removal 12.00 0.0100 0.120 
4 Port Flange Preparation 13.00 0.0100 0.130 
5 Port plug Assembly removal, transportation 
and insertion into hot cell 
TBD by 
ITER
6 Port plug testing, and assembly Installation 
TBD by 
ITER
7 Port Interspace Pipe and service equipment 
Installation 106.00 0.0139 1.470 
8 Bio-Shield Plug Installation 25.00 0.0050 0.125 
9 AEU installation 120.00 2.620 
9.1 Port cell preparation. Temporary supports, 
equipment, tools and saftey equipment 6.00 0.0131 0.788 
9.2 Position AEU in Port Cell Area, connect to 
building power check equipment status inside the 
transporter. 4.00 0.0128 0.051 
9.3 TBM/AEU Service connections 41.00 0.0242 0.994 
9.4 AEU/Pipe chase area connections 53.00 0.0242 1.280 
9.5 Pressure testing, leak testing and full system test 
and inspection including service qualification 10.00 0.0131 0.131 
9.6 Remove all equipment, tooling, temporary 
supports, and testing equipment from port cell 
area. 6.00 0.0131 0.788 
Total 388.00 7.390 
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Table 6.  Predicted doses for AEU component maintenance. 
Component type 
Probability
of a 
component
in this type 
failing in a 
calendar
year
Person-
hours active 
repair time  
(hours)
Dose Rate 
mSv/hr 
 Annual 
Dose
(p-mSv)
Motor controller 0.26 5 0.0499 0.0649 
Circuit breaker 0.001 12   0.0000 
Pump motor 0.04 100 0.0499 0.1996 
Pump 0.28 14 0.0499 0.1956 
Level sensor 0.016 12 0.0352 0.0068 
Pressure sensor 0.021 12 0.0499 0.0126 
Temperature sensor 0.18 12 0.0828 0.1788 
Piping 0.006 60   0.0000 
Check valve 0.024 48 0.0717 0.0826 
Motor operated valve 0.11 15 0.0717 0.1183 
Flow control valve 0.022 15 0.0717 0.0237 
Transition to 
concentric pipe 
0.00017 60 0.0139 0.0001 
Concentric pipe 0.00022 60 0.0139 0.0002 
Mixing tank 0.00035 80 0.074 0.0021 
T extraction tank 0.008 60 0.065 0.0312 
Pb-Li to He heat 
exchanger
0.014 60 0.0891 0.0748 
Pump expansion tank 0.07 80 0.0499 0.2794 
Cold trap 0.039 40 0.0744 0.1161 
Cold trap heat 
exchanger
0.004 40 0.0744 0.0119 
Drain tank 0.004 80 0.0882 0.0282 
Rupture disk 0.034 2 0.0882 0.0060 
Pressure relief valve 0.014 15 0.0882 0.0185 
Drain tank electric 
heater
0.005 8 0.0882 0.0035 
      Total 1.455 
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Appendix A 
Detail Time Estimate for Replacing the DCLL TBM 
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Task
Number Description Process Type Est. Duration 
Bio-Shield 
 Plug Status No. of Ops Total Time 
1 Remove AEU from Port cell Area   Closed  67.00
1.1
Prepare AEU for system separation and 
relocation to storage and maintenance 
area including tools.  8 Closed 1 8.00
1.1.1
Drain Pb-Li into drain tank and purge 
fluids from TBM with hot helium. 
Remote
operation 3 Closed   
1.1.2
De-Pressurize and close all He valves in 
transporter and at the TCWS 
Remote
operation 3 Closed   
1.1.3
Disconnect external power source to AEU 
and secure portable power for internal 
AEU use. Hands on 2 Closed   
1.2
Cut and remove primary and secondary 
He coolant lines between AEU and Pipe 
chase area   Closed  22.00
1.2.1 remove local pipe insulation Hands on 1 Closed 5 5.00 
1.2.2 cut pipes on the AEU side hands on 1 Closed 5 5.00 
1.2.3 cut pipes on building side  Hands on 1 Closed 5 5.00 
1.2.4
inset pipe plugs to close pipes on both 
sides to prevent any FOC Hands on 1/2 Closed 10 5.00 
1.2.5
Store Pipe and Insulation segments into 
Maintenance container Hands on 2  1 2.00 
1.3
Cut and remove primary and secondary 
He coolant lines between Transporter and 
Bio-Shield Plug Hands on  Closed  8.00
1.3.1 remove local pipe insulation Hands On 1 Closed 2 2.00 
1.3.2 cut He pipe on AEU and Bio-shield sides Hands on 1 Closed 4 4.00 
1.3.3
Store Pipe and Insulation segments into 
Maintenance container Hands On 2  1 2.00 
1.4
Cut and separate Concentric Pb-Li pipe 
assembly Hands on  Closed  29.00
1.4.1
Set up portable maintenance tent for 
environment control Hands on 4 Closed 1 4.00 
1.4.2
remove pipe insulation along with trace 
heating elements at this section Hands on 1 Closed 1 1.00 
1.4.3
Cut External Pipe at designated position 
close to AEU Hands on 1 Closed 1 1.00 
1.4.4 Dis-Engage Internal pipe at sliding joint Hands on 2 Closed 1 2.00 
1.4.5
Cut and remove insulation from Purge 
Flow and drain Pipes Hands on 2 Closed 2 4.00 
1.4.6
Install pipe plugs for all He lines, Purge 
line and Pb-Li lines on AEU side. Hands on 1 Closed 4 4.00 
1.4.7
Disconnect all Power, Diagnostic and 
Control connectors between AEU and Bio 
Shield Hands on 2  1 2.00 
1.4.8 Remove environment control tent Hands on 3  1 3.00 
1.4.9
Move AEU out of the port cell area and 
send to maintenance area 
Remote
operation 2 Closed 1 2.00 
1.4.10
Clear port cell area of all Debris and store 
all the excess pipe segments in temporary 
storage. Hands on 4 Closed 1 4.00 
1.4.11
remove all tools and other equipment to 
clear path for Bio-shield Plug removal Hands on 2 Closed 1 2.00 
2 Bio-Shield Plug removal     12.00
2.1 Port Preparation     11.00 
2.1.1
install lift equipment and tools designed 
for Bio-Shield plug removal Hands on 6 Closed 1 6.00 
2.1.2
position Bio-Shield Plug transporter in port 
cell area Hands on 2 Closed 1 2.00 
2.1.3
remove Bio-Shield Plug and store inside 
the bio-shield transporter Hands on 2 Open 1 2.00 
2.1.4
Close transporter and move to temporary 
storage
Remote
operation 1  1 1.00 
3 Equatorial Port Interspace Pipe   Open  60.00
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removal 
3.1 Interspace Preparation process Hands on  Open  10.00
3.1.1 Position storage Container in Port Cell Hands on 2 Open 1 2.00 
3.1.2
Install temporary pipe supports under all 
piping in Interspace area. Hands on 1 Open 5 5.00 
3.1.3
Disconnect and remove all power, 
diagnostic and control cables. Hands on 3 Open 1 3.00 
3.2 Pipe Hanger removal     28.00
3.2.1
Remove pipe insulation and clear area 
around pipe hanger for He lines, Purge 
line and Pb-Li concentric line Hands on 1 Open 14 14.00 
3.2.2
Disconnect pipe hangers from pipe and 
from port ceiling and store in Storage 
container Hands on 1 Open 14 14.00 
3.3 Concentric pipe removal     6.00
3.3.1
Remove pipe insulation and separate 
trace heating element at cut location Hands on 2 Open 1 2.00 
3.3.2
Cut External Pipe at designated position 
closest to the TBM Frame assembly Hands on 1 Open 1 1.00 
3.3.3
Pull concentric pipe assembly to separate 
the internal pipe slip joint Hands on 1 Open 1 1.00 
3.3.4 Plug all exposed pipes Hands on 1 Open 1 1.00 
3.3.5
Move concentric pipe assembly to storage 
container Hands on 1 Open 1 1.00 
3.4 He Pipe removal     16.00
3.4.1 remove insulation at pipe cut locations Hands on 1 Open 3 3.00 
3.4.2
Cut He pipes at specified location closest 
to the TBM frame assembly Hands on 1 Open 3 3.00 
3.4.3 Plug all exposed pipes Hands on 1 Open 3 3.00 
3.4.4
Store Pipe and Insulation segments in 
Maintenance container Hands on 2 Open 1 2.00 
3.4.5
Remove all temporary pipe supports, 
remove all tools and clear port interspace 
area of any debris. Hands on 5 Open 1 5.00 
4 Port Flange Preparation     13.00
4.1
Position special tooling for Port Flange 
cutting and Un-Bolting Hands on 4 Open 1 4.00 
4.2
Perform Lip Seal cutting operation, clean 
and remove all debris Hands on 6 Open 1 6.00 
4.3 Un-Bolt all Port flange nuts and store Hands on 3 Open 1 3.00 
5
Port plug Assembly removal, 
transportation and insertion into hot 
cell
Automated RH 
process     
6
Port plug testing, and assembly 
Installation 
Automated RH 
process     
X
Need to add a section on AEU 
maintenance and testing Hands on     
7
Port Interspace Pipe and service 
equipment Installation     108.00
7.1 Port Preparation   open  13.00 
7.1.1
Install rack and support equipment inside 
port space area. hands on 6 open 1 6.00 
7.1.2
Move all tooling and equipment into port 
space area Hands on 3 open 1 3.00 
7.1.3
Position Storage transporter in Port cell 
area Automated   2 open 1 2.00 
7.1.4
Secure Power, and other service into port 
area. (Compressed Gases, safety 
equipment and services etc..) Hands on 2 open 1 2.00 
7.2 Port Interspace Pipe Installation    open  91.00
7.2.1 He and Purge Pipe Installation   open  62.00 
7.2.1.1
measure, prepare and align weld joint for 
all He and purge line weld segments Hands on 2 open 3 6.00 
7.2.1.2
Locate pipe hanger position in the port 
interspace area, mount hangers in proper Hands On 1 open 14 14.00 
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7.2.1.3
using temporary rigging, install He and 
purge pipe in the port Interspace area, 
match pipes with TBM at the weld joint 
and fix pipe in preparation for welding Hands on 3 open 3 9.00 
7.2.1.4
Install permanent pipe hangers and adjust 
to insure proper joint alignment. Hands on 1 open 14 14.00 
7.2.1.5
weld pipe joints for the He and purge lines 
at the TBM side. Hands on 1 open 3 3.00 
7.2.1.6 Inspect Weld Joints Hands on 1 open 3 3.00 
7.2.1.7 Pressure Test for He loop/TBM Hands on 4 open 1 4.00 
7.2.1.8
install pipe insulation and protective 
covers. Hands on 2 open 3 6.00 
7.2.1.9
remove all temporary pipe supports for the 
He and purge lines. Hands on 3 open 1 3.00 
7.2.2
Pb-Li concentric pipe assembly 
installation   open  26.00 
7.2.2.1
locate and position hangers in the Port 
Interspace area for the LL pipe assembly Hands on 1 open 2 2.00 
7.2.2.2
prepare weld flanges on the concentric 
pipe assembly and the TBM Hands on 2 open 1 2.00 
7.2.2.3
assemble internal slip joint and position 
external pipe weld joint at the TBM side Hands on 2 open 1 2.00 
7.2.2.4
install permanent pipe hangers for the 
concentric pipe assembly Hands on 1 open 2 2.00 
7.2.2.5 Install environmental control tent Hands on 2 open 1 2.00 
7.2.2.6
Weld external and drain pipe joint at the 
TBM side  Hands on 1 open 2 2.00 
7.2.2.7 Weld inspection Hands on 1 open 2 2.00 
7.2.2.8 Pb-Li Loop Pressure Test Hands on 2 open 1 2.00 
7.2.2.9
Install Heat Trace elements on external 
pipe Hands on 2 open 2 4.00 
7.2.2.10 Install insulation and protective covers Hands on 2 open 2 4.00 
7.2.2.11 Remove environment control tent Hands on 2  1 2.00 
7.2.3
Diagnostics and control harness 
installation Hands on 3 open 1 3.00 
7.3
Remove all temporary supports, 
tooling, equipment and clean Port 
Interspace area, and remove storage 
container from Port cell area Hands on 4 open 1 4.00
8 Bio-Shield Plug Installation     25.00
8.1
Position tooling and supports around Bio-
shield door opening Hands on 6 open 1 6.00 
8.2
position Bio-Shield Plug transporter in port 
cell area Hands on 3 open 1 3.00 
8.3
Open transporter and install Bio-Shield 
Plug Hands on 8 open 1 8.00 
8.4
Install seals around pipe penetrations 
through the Bio-Shield Plug. Hands on 1 open 5 5.00 
8.5
remove Bio-Shield Transporter, all tooling, 
supports and equipment from Port Cell 
area. Hands on 3 open 1 3.00 
9 AEU installation   Closed  129.00
9.1
Port cell preparation. Temporary supports, 
equipment, tools and safety equipment Hands on 6 Closed 1 6.00 
9.2
Position AEU in Port Cell Area, connect to 
building power check equipment status 
inside the transporter. Hands on 4 Closed 1 4.00 
9.3 TBM/AEU Service connections   Closed  43.00 
9.3.1
He Pipe connection between Bio-shield 
and Transporter Hands on  Closed  24.00 
9.3.1.1
Measure and prepare pipe segments for 
He and purge lines and prepare weld 
joints. Hands on 2 Closed 3 6.00 
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9.3.1.2
Position and align pipe segments and 
secure with temporary supports. Hands on 2 Closed 3 6.00 
9.3.1.3
Weld pipe segment at both end from Bio-
shield side and Transporter side. Hands on 2 Closed 3 6.00 
9.3.1.4 weld inspection Hands on 1 Closed 6 6.00 
9.3.2 Pb-Li concentric Pipe connection   Closed  15.00 
9.3.2.1 Install environmental control tent Hands on 3 Closed 1 3.00 
9.3.2.2
Assemble Internal Slip Joint with 
Transporter pipe. Hands on 2 Closed 1 2.00 
9.3.2.3 Position external pipe joint and secure Hands on 2 Closed 1 2.00 
9.3.2.4
Weld external pipe joint at Transporter 
Side  Hands on 1 Closed 1 1.00 
9.3.2.5 Weld inspection Hands on 1 Closed 1 1.00 
9.3.2.6 Remove environment control tent Hands on 2 Closed 1 2.00 
9.3.2.7
Install trace heating on Pb-Li pipe 
segment Hands on 2 Closed 1 2.00 
9.3.2.8 Install insulation and protective covers Hands on 2 Closed 1 2.00 
9.3.3
Diagnostics and control service 
connections from Bio-shield to AEU Hands on 1 Closed 4 4.00 
9.4 AEU/Pipe chase area connections Hands on  Closed  60.00 
9.4.1 He pipe connections   Closed  60.00 
9.4.1.1
Measure and prepare pipe segment for 
fitting between transporter and building 
penetration. Hands on 2 Closed 5 10.00 
9.4.1.2 remove pipe plugs from all pipes Hands on 1 Closed 10 10.00 
9.4.1.3 fit pipes in place with temporary supports Hands on 2 Closed 5 10.00 
9.4.1.4 weld He pipe Joints at both sides Hands on 1 Closed 10 10.00 
9.4.1.5 Weld inspection Hands on 1 Closed 10 10.00 
9.4.1.6 Install insulation and protective covers Hands on 2 Closed 5 10.00 
9.5
Pressure testing, leak testing and full 
system test and inspection including 
service qualification Hands on 10 Closed 1 10.00 
9.6
remove all equipment, tooling, temporary 
supports, and testing equipment from port 
cell area. Hands on 6 Closed 1 6.00 
